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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In a bizarre turn of events, Mikhail Sebastian found himself trapped on 
American Samoa in December 2011.1  He was not trapped because he was 
arrested or kidnapped, or any of the other reasons one might expect; rather, 
Sebastian was trapped due to his stateless status.2  Sebastian, who  had been 
living in the United States for over fifteen years, took what he thought would 
be a four-day vacation, and ended up pleading with the U.S. to allow him to 
return to his home in Los Angeles.3 
In 2004, Ibrahim Parlak, a Kurdish man, had been living in the U.S. for 
over twenty years after being granted asylum in 1992.4  Parlak had married 
an American woman.  They had a daughter together, and he was the proud 
owner of a café in a small town in Michigan.5  He was living the American 
dream.  But Parlak’s idyllic world was flipped on its head in July 2004, when 
the Department of Homeland Security arrested Parlak, accused him of 
falsifying his asylum documents, and threatened to deport him to Turkey.6  
U.S. authorities revoked Parlak’s green card, and threw him in detention 
pending his deportation.7 
Tatiana Lesnikova, a sixty-one-year-old grandmother and piano teacher, 
has been stateless and living in the U.S. for over twenty years.8  In 1992, 
Lesnikova escaped with her youngest son from Ukraine, where she had been 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Mikhail Sebastian, Stateless in the United States, WASH. POST (July 4, 2013), http://articl 
es.washingtonpost.com/2013-07-04/opinions/40369698_1_travel-documents-turkmenistan-u-
s-officials; see also NPR Staff, Stateless and Stranded on American Samoa, NPR (Oct. 7, 
2012, 2:22 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/10/07/162445840/stateless-and-stranded-on-americ 
an-samoa. 
 2 Sebastian, supra note 1. 
 3 NPR Staff, In Limbo: Stateless Man Stuck on American Samoa, NPR (Dec. 29, 2012, 
5:22 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/12/29/168255952/in-limbo-stateless-man-stuck-on-ameri 
can-samoa; Sebastian, supra note 1. 
 4 Stewart A. Swerdlow, The Man Without a Country, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 25, 2013, 
4:41 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stewart-a-swerdlow/the-man-without-a-country_1 
_b_4160094.html; FREE IBRAHIM, http://freeibrahim.com/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2014). 
 5 Swerdlow, supra note 4; see also Alex Kotlowitz, The Politics of Ibrahim Parlak, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 20, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/20/magazine/20PRISON.html?pagewa 
nted=print&_r=0. 
 6 Swerdlow, supra note 4; see also Kotlowitz, supra note 5. 
 7 Swerdlow, supra note 4. 
 8 Jason Dzubow, Help for the Stateless?, UNHCR REFUGEES DAILY (June 23, 2010, 4:01 
AM), http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refdaily?pass=463ef21123&id=4c2441825; see 
also Laurel Bowman, Human Rights Activists Focus on Stateless for World Refugee Day, 
VOICE OF AMERICA (June 15, 2010, 8:00 PM), http://www.voanews.com/content/human-right 
s-activists-focus-on-stateless-for-world-refugee-day-96509754/119749.html. 
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persecuted for her political beliefs, and applied for asylum in the U.S.9  In 
1997, Lesnikova’s application was denied; however, she had nowhere to be 
deported, as neither Ukraine nor Russia recognized her as a national due to 
their post-Soviet nationality laws.10  
A stateless person is an individual who is not considered a national by 
any State under the operation of its laws.11  A 2013 report by the Office of 
the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that there 
are at least ten million stateless individuals in the world today,12 with over 
600,000 in Europe13 and an undetermined number living in the U.S.14  U.S. 
law does not afford these individuals any protections, let alone the ability to 
acquire any sort of permanent status.15  In the European Union, nationality 
laws vary from country to country.  Stateless persons are often denied crucial 
benefits of citizenship, such as access to health services, education, and legal 
employment.16  The international community has ignored such violations for 
far too long.  With no official status, stateless persons are deprived of their 
basic human rights and are subject to deportation, imprisonment, or worse.17 
Mikhail Sebastian eventually was allowed to go back to his home in the 
United States—fifteen months later.18  By enlisting the help of attorneys and 
                                                                                                                   
 9 Dzubow, supra note 8. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons art. 1, Sept. 28, 1954, 360 
U.N.T.S. 130 [hereinafter 1954 Statelessness Convention]; see also Alison Harvey, 
Statelessness: The “De Facto” Statelessness Debate, 24 J. IMMIGR. ASYLUM & NATIONALITY 
L. 257, 259 (2010), available at http://citizenshiprightsinafrica.org/docs/IANL%f202010%20 
De%20facto%20statelessness%20debate%20Alison%20Harvey.pdf. 
 12 UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, GLOBAL TRENDS 2012, DISPLACEMENT: THE 
NEW 21ST CENTURY CHALLENGE 2 (2013), available at http://unhcr.org/globaltrendsjune2013/ 
UNHCR%20GLOBAL%20TRENDS%202012_V05.pdf [hereinafter GLOBAL TRENDS 2012]. 
 13 EUROPEAN NETWORK ON STATELESSNESS, ANNUAL REPORT 2012/13, at 1, available at 
http://www.statelessness.eu/sites/www.statelessness.eu/files/attachments/resources/ENS_2012
-13_Annual%20Report.pdf. 
 14 UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES & OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, 
CITIZENS OF NOWHERE: SOLUTIONS FOR THE STATELESS IN THE U.S. 1 (2012), available at 
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/citizens-of-nowhere-solutions-for-th 
e-stateless-in-the-us-20121213.pdf; see also Jay Milbrandt, Stateless, 20 CARDOZO J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 75, 80–81 (2011) (“According to the U.S. State Department, data on statelessness is 
so limited that the international community does not even know if the numbers are growing or 
shrinking.”). 
 15 Citizens of Nowhere, supra note 14, at 1.  
 16 UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, GLOBAL REPORT 2012, at 16 (2013), 
available at http://www.unhcr.org/51b1d61db.html. 
 17 Milbrandt, supra note 14, at 81 (“The stateless are the most vulnerable people in our 
world—they are the trafficked, the oppressed, and the neglected.”). 
 18 Sebastian, supra note 1. 
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various news organizations, as well as the UNHCR, Sebastian was able to 
convince U.S. officials to allow him to return.19  But Sebastian remains 
stateless today, living in constant fear of detainment with no available path 
for obtaining permanent legal status.20 
For Ibrahim Parlak, his American dream has become a nightmare.21  
Turkey would not admit Parlak back into the country, and his applications 
for residency in other countries have been denied.22  Eventually, following a 
public outcry, Parlak was released “under a strict, supervised status.”23  This 
status comes with severe limitations on Parlak’s freedom: “He cannot go 
anywhere without permission.  He must be on call from immigration service 
at all times.  He cannot leave the country.  He must call in whenever asked, 
no matter what time of the day or night.”24  Periodically, legislation to grant 
Parlak citizenship is introduced in Congress but, thus far, these efforts have 
been fruitless.25  Parlak remains in a limbo and expresses little hope of ever 
obtaining a legal status in the U.S. again.26 
Tatiana Lesnikova and her youngest son also remain stateless today.27  In 
a 2010 interview with Laura Bowman, Lesnikova remarked: “To be 
stateless . . . means to be nobody.  We have no rights.”28  Lesnikova is unable 
to travel to see her closest family members because she cannot obtain travel 
documents.29  She is ineligible for social security even though she pays 
taxes.30  She must check in with the Department of Homeland Security by 
telephone once a month and in person every six months.31  And, on top of all 
of this, she says that she still lives in fear of being “arbitrarily jailed” at any 
moment.32 
In evaluating the policies of the United States and the European Union, 
Part II will provide additional background information on statelessness, 
including how it has progressed over time, the early developments in the law, 
and its potential impact.  Part III will then provide the foundation for the 
                                                                                                                   
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Swerdlow, supra note 4. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Dzubow, supra note 8. 
 28 Bowman, supra note 8. 
 29 Dzubow, supra note 8. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
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current legal framework for both the U.S. as well as the E.U., and discuss the 
advantages and disadvantages of each.  In conclusion, Part IV will examine 
the most effective legal policy for the U.S. going forward and advocate for 
the passage of comprehensive immigration reform. 
II.  BACKGROUND ON STATELESSNESS 
Statelessness is a condition, caused by governments, that occurs when no 
state recognizes a person as its citizen under the operations of its law.33  
Effectively, such an individual is not entitled to the protections of any state.34  
Statelessness can happen anywhere in the world, but how statelessness 
effects an individual varies because legal regimes throughout the world differ 
considerably.35 
A.  De Jure and De Facto Statelessness 
Depending on the country, statelessness can occur in many different 
situations, including: birth to stateless parents;36 when a state ceases to 
exist;37 through transnational surrogacy agreements, which can leave a child 
without citizenship due to conflicts of law;38 as well as situations where 
individuals are unable to establish their nationality.39 
There are two categories of statelessness: de facto and de jure.40  De jure 
statelessness is when no state considers the individual to be a national based 
on its own laws.41  This can occur when a state ceases to exist and there is no 
successor state, a situation recognized by both the 1954 Convention on the 
Status of Stateless Persons (the 1954 Statelessness Convention)42 and the 
1961 Convention on Reducing Statelessness (the 1961 Statelessness 
                                                                                                                   
 33 See 1954 Statelessness Convention, supra note 11; see also Milbrandt, supra note 14, at 81. 
 34 Statelessness, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/j/prm/policyissues/issues/c50 
242.htm (last visited July 31, 2014). 
 35 Brad K. Blitz & Caroline Sawyer, Analysis: The Practical and Legal Realities of 
Statelessness in the European Union, in STATELESSNESS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: DISPLACED, 
UNDOCUMENTED, UNWANTED 284, 288 (Caroline Sawyer & Brad K. Blitz eds., 2011). 
 36 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 37 Milbrandt, supra note 14, at 81. 
 38 Harvey, supra note 11, at 258. 
 39 Milbrandt, supra note 14, at 82. 
 40 Polly J. Price, Stateless in the United States: Current Reality and a Future Prediction, 46 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 443, 450 (2013). 
 41 Id. 
 42 1954 Statelessness Convention, supra note 11, art. 10. 
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Convention).43  De facto statelessness, on the other hand, occurs when a 
person is either denied diplomatic protection or assistance by their country 
once they are outside of it,44 or is prevented from seeking it due to practical 
considerations like fear of persecution.45  There are no real solutions for 
either category as of yet in international law.46  Because de jure statelessness 
occurs less frequently,47 de facto statelessness will be the primary focus of 
this Note. 
B.  Theories of Citizenship 
A state’s nationality laws are key factors in whether or not an individual 
will become stateless.48  Each state has the power to determine its own 
nationality laws, but such sovereignty makes it difficult to address 
statelessness at an international level.49  In addition, this deference to states 
may result in intentional discrimination against a particular group.50 
The two most frequently used principles for granting citizenship are jus 
soli and jus sanguinis,51 with some countries using both.52  Jus soli, meaning 
“law of the soil,” refers to individuals who are born on state territory and are 
entitled to the citizenship of that state.53  Jus sanguinis, which means “law of 
blood,” refers to an individual who is entitled to the same citizenship of their 
parents.54  This varies from country to country—the U.S. uses somewhat of a 
mix of jus sanguinis and the rule of jus soli,55 while many European 
countries use jus sanguinis.56  The use of jus sanguinis tends to be more 
                                                                                                                   
 43 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness arts. 1–4, Aug. 30, 1961, 989 U.N.T.S. 175 
[hereinafter 1961 Statelessness Convention]; see also Milbrandt, supra note 14, at 81–82. 
 44 Price, supra note 40, at 450; Harvey, supra note 11, at 261. 
 45 Milbrandt, supra note 14, at 82. 
 46 Caroline Sawyer, Stateless in Europe: Legal Aspects of De Jure and De Facto 
Statelessness in the European Union, in STATELESSNESS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: DISPLACED, 
UNDOCUMENTED, UNWANTED, supra note 35, at 69, 71–72. 
 47 Id. at 83. 
 48 Harvey, supra note 11, at 257. 
 49 Sawyer, supra note 46, at 70–71 (“The difficulty for international law solutions to 
statelessness is that nationality and citizenship are both aspects of national sovereignty to be 
defined by countries themselves.”). 
 50 Milbrandt, supra note 14, at 81. 
 51 Id. at 89–90. 
 52 Harvey, supra note 11, at 258. 
 53 Milbrandt, supra note 14, at 90. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Price, supra note 40, at 445. 
 56 Id. at 451–52. 
2014] NO COUNTRY FOR SOME MEN?  287 
 
problematic in the sense that it can lead to many generations of stateless 
persons, whereas jus soli limits statelessness to only one generation.57 
C.  Early Developments in International Law 
Over the years, there has been a slow and steady development of 
international law addressing state nationality and citizenship laws. 
The 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the 
Conflict of Nationality Laws (the Hague Convention) demonstrates the 
emerging principle that a state determines its nationals under its own law.58  
Article 1 of the Hague Convention asserts this principle and adds that such 
laws “shall be recognised by other States in so far as it is consistent with 
international conventions, international custom, and the principles of law 
generally recognised with regard to nationality.”59  Article 2 states that the 
nationality of an individual “shall be determined in accordance with the law 
of the State.”60 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which was issued 
in 1948, asserted the right to a nationality.61  The Declaration recognizes that 
“everyone has the right to a nationality” as well as a right to not be 
“arbitrarily deprived” of that nationality or denied the right to change it.62  
Further, Article 14 of the UDHR asserts the right of individuals to seek and 
enjoy asylum from persecution in other countries, but qualifies this right by 
saying that it only applies to persecution, and not genuine prosecutions 
arising from non-political crimes.63 
Subsequently, in 1950, the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) was created.64  The U.N. General Assembly later 
charged the UNHCR, through a series of resolutions, with the prevention and 
                                                                                                                   
 57 Id. at 444–45 (“But at present this statelessness at least is limited to one generation, 
because under existing practices of territorial birthright citizenship, the children of 
unauthorized immigrants are automatically awarded U.S. citizenship at birth if born in the 
United States.”). 
 58 Harvey, supra note 11, at 257. 
 59 Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws art. 1, 179 
L.N.T.S. 89 (Apr. 13, 1930) [hereinafter Hague Convention]. 
 60 Id. art. 2. 
 61 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 15, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]; see also Blitz & Sawyer, supra note 35, at 3. 
 62 UDHR, supra note 61.   
 63 Id. art. 14; Citizenship Through Parents, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, 
http://www.uscis.gov/us-citizenship/citizenship-through-parents (last visited Oct. 14, 2014).   
 64 History of UNHCR: A Global Humanitarian Organization of Humble Origins, UNHCR, 
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646cbc.html (last visited July 31, 2014). 
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reduction of statelessness along with the protection of stateless individuals.65  
Along with the UDHR, several other instruments have recognized the right 
to a nationality, including the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child,66 
the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,67 and the 1965 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.68 
However, the UDHR has been criticized as having no practical validity since 
few of its provisions are directly enforceable.69  For instance, the right to 
seek asylum is unenforceable since there is no corresponding obligation on 
any state to grant asylum.70 
The 1954 Statelessness Convention established a definition of 
statelessness and enumerated several rights that stateless persons are entitled 
to have.71  The 1954 Statelessness Convention established “an internationally 
recognized status for stateless persons which extend[ed] to them specific 
rights . . . [including] issuance of identity and travel documents.”72  
However, stateless persons in states which are not a party to the 1954 
Statelessness Convention would remain unprotected.73 
Subsequently, the 1961 Statelessness Convention, which expanded on the 
1954 Statelessness Convention, addressed the issues of avoiding 
statelessness as well as resolving conflicts concerning nationality.74  Articles 
                                                                                                                   
 65 UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES GLOBAL LEARNING CENTER, SELF-STUDY 
MODULE ON STATELESSNESS 12 (2012), available at http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/50b8996 
02.pdf; see also GLOBAL TRENDS 2012, supra note 12, at 29. 
 66 Convention on the Rights of the Child arts. 7–8, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 67 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 24, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
 68 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 5, 
Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; DIV. OF INT’L PROT., UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR 
REFUGEES, UNHCR ACTION TO ADDRESS STATELESSNESS 6 (2010), available at http://www.re 
fworld.org/pdfid/50b80b899602.pdf; see also GLOBAL TRENDS 2012, supra note 12, at 29. 
 69 Sawyer, supra note 46, at 74–75. 
 70 Id. at 76. 
 71 1954 Statelessness Convention, supra note 11; Price, supra note 40, at 448. 
 72 UNHCR ACTION TO ADDRESS STATELESSNESS, supra note 68, at 5. 
 73 Sawyer, supra note 46, at 80; 1954 Statelessness Convention, supra note 11 (as of 
November 2013, the United States is not a signatory, and the only non-signatory E.U. Member 
States are as follows: Cyprus, Estonia, Malta, and Poland.  A complete list is available on the 
U.N. website at: http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20V/ 
V-3.en.pdf). 
 74 1961 Statelessness Convention, supra note 43 (as of November 2013, the United States is 
not a signatory and the only non-signatory E.U. Member States are as follows: Cyprus, 
Estonia, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, and Spain.  A complete list is available on 
the U.N. website at: http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20 
V/V-4.en.pdf); see also Jessica Parra, Note, Stateless Roma in the European Union: 
Reconciling the Doctrine of Sovereignty Concerning Nationality Laws with International 
Agreements to Reduce and Avoid Statelessness, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1666, 1674 (2011) 
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1 through 4 of the 1961 Statelessness Convention set forth nationality laws to 
prevent statelessness among children.75  Specifically, Article 1 of the 1961 
Statelessness Convention asserts that a “Contracting State shall grant its 
nationality to a person born in its territory who would otherwise be 
stateless.”76  Note that if a state employing jus sanguinis were to adopt the 
1961 Statelessness Convention, Article 1 would effectively solve the 
problem of statelessness carrying over to subsequent generations discussed 
above.77  Articles 8 and 9 address deprivation of nationality, establishing that 
states cannot deprive individuals of nationality based on discriminatory 
factors or in such a manner that would result in statelessness.78  In terms of 
enforceability, Article 11 envisioned the establishment of an international 
body for reviewing individual claims to the benefits of the 1961 Statelessness 
Convention.79  No such body was ever created, however, and there is no 
system in place today for an individual to receive assistance in obtaining a 
valid nationality.80 
The International Court of Justice was established in 1945 by the U.N. 
Charter and is the principal U.N. judicial organ.81  Even though the Court is 
not bound by its precedent,82 it often adheres to it, making its prior decisions 
relevant to analysis of the developments in international law.  In the 1955 
Nottebohm Case, the Court stated that “it is for every sovereign State[ ] to 
settle by its own legislation the rules relating to the acquisition of its 
nationality. . . .”83  In other words, as the judgment in Nottebohm put it, 
“nationality is within the domestic jurisdiction of the State.”84  The Court 
went on to define nationality as “a legal bond having as its basis a social fact 
                                                                                                                   
(noting the principle objectives of the 1961 Convention were to circumvent statelessness and 
clarify nationality). 
 75 1961 Statelessness Convention, supra note 43, arts. 1–4; UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R 
FOR REFUGEES, PREVENTING AND REDUCING STATELESSNESS: THE 1961 CONVENTION ON THE 
REDUCTION OF STATELESSNESS 4 (2010), available at http://www.unhcr.org/4ca5937d9.html. 
 76 1961 Statelessness Convention, supra note 43, art. 1. 
 77 See supra Part II.B. 
 78 1961 Statelessness Convention, supra note 43, arts. 8–9. 
 79 Id. art. 11 (“The Contracting States shall promote the establishment within the 
framework of the United Nations . . . of a body to which a person claiming the benefit of this 
Convention may apply for the examination of his claim and for assistance in presenting it to 
the appropriate authority.”). 
 80 Sawyer, supra note 46, at 80. 
 81 The Court, INT’L COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1 (last 
visited Nov. 18, 2013). 
 82 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, June 26, 1945, 3 Bevans 1179, 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0#CHAPTER_II. 
 83 Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, 20 (Apr. 6). 
 84 Id. 
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of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, 
together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties.”85  In response to 
the definition, Caroline Sawyer, a Senior Law Lecturer at New Zealand’s 
Victoria University Wellington,86 wrote in 2011: “Statelessness is the 
obverse [of nationality], describing a position of detachment, exclusion and 
abandonment. . . .  [C]itizenship still provides the means through which 
[universal basic human] rights may be vindicated.  The correlation of this is 
that those without a nationality may in practice be excluded from human 
rights.”87  A state’s decision regarding its nationality laws have a substantial 
impact on the number of stateless persons excluded from basic human rights 
that found within its borders. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
This Note will now turn to an examination of current U.S. and E.U. laws 
and policy on the issue of stateless persons.  Examination of the differences 
in the legal framework will aid in understanding the implications of the laws 
and policies in place. 
A. U.S. Laws and Policies 
The United States is an advocate for addressing the challenges of 
statelessness.  The U.S. is the single largest donor to the UNHCR, which is 
tasked with protecting stateless individuals.88  In December 2011, then 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton committed the Obama Administration to 
the enactment of statelessness legislation in the U.S., and a taskforce on 
statelessness was created by the Department of State.89  In addition to 
attempting to change domestic policies on statelessness, the U.S. has taken 
on the issue at the international level.90  Secretary Clinton “urged countries to 
tackle a major cause of statelessness — nationality laws that discriminate 
                                                                                                                   
 85 Id. at 23. 
 86 STATELESSNESS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 35, at i, vii. 
 87 Sawyer, supra note 46, at 69. 
 88 NICOLE GREEN & TODD PIERCE, COMBATING STATELESSNESS: A GOVERNMENT PERSPECTIVE, 
35 (2009), available at http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR32/34-35.pdf; see also 
Statelessness, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/j/prm/policyissues/issues/c50242.htm 
(last visited Oct. 2, 2013). 
 89 Mark Leon Goldberg, American Immigration Reform May Finally Help ‘Stateless’ 
People, UN DISPATCH (May 9, 2013), http://www.undispatch.com/american-immigration-refo 
rm-may-finally-help-stateless-people. 
 90 Id. 
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against women.”91  She also has stated: “In this compromised state [of 
statelessness], women and children are vulnerable to abuse and exploitation, 
including gender-based violence, trafficking in persons, and arbitrary arrest 
and detention.”92  Clinton’s sentiment seems to suggest that such perilous 
conditions must be avoided whenever possible. 
Despite assertions by some Obama Administration officials of a need to 
resolve the statelessness problem, the U.S. has taken no concrete action.93  In 
population estimates from March 2012, the Department of Homeland 
Security estimated that as of 2011, 11.5 million people in the U.S. were 
unauthorized migrants.94  The number of stateless individuals is unknown.95  
The UNHCR estimated in a 2012 report that there were several hundred 
stateless individuals in the U.S., but noted that the actual number could be 
significantly higher.96  For instance, U.S. Rep. Lamar Smith maintained in a 
2011 hearing before the Subcommittee on Immigration Policy and 
Enforcement of U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary 
that “between 2009 and 2011 the U.S. government released almost 10,000 
deportees after their purported countries of origin refused to take them back,” 
making them de facto stateless.97 
1.  Current Legal Framework 
The 1958 U.S. Supreme Court case Trop v. Dulles concerned a person 
who became stateless when the U.S. revoked his citizenship as a punishment 
for wartime desertion.98  The Court condemned statelessness, and held that 
such a punishment was a violation of the prohibition set out in the Eighth 
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Amendment to the Constitution against cruel and unusual punishment.99  
Chief Justice Earl Warren, writing for the plurality, said that to render a 
person stateless is “a form of punishment more primitive than torture” and 
that it amounts to a “total destruction of the individual’s status in organized 
society.”100  The plurality went on to say that this condition of statelessness, 
the loss of the “right to have rights,” is “deplored in the international 
community,” such that the “civilized nations of the world are in virtual 
unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for crime.”101  
Surely, then, it should not be imposed on those who have committed no 
crime. 
In two more recent judgments—Zadvydas v. Davis, decided in 2001,102 
and Clark v. Martinez, decided in 2005103—the Supreme Court ruled that 
stateless persons could not be held in detention indefinitely under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act.104  After six months of detention, the 
burden shifts to the U.S. to establish by clear and convincing evidence the 
likelihood of removal through deportation in the reasonably foreseeable 
future.105  While there is some precedent on the issue, according to a 2013 
report by the Center for Migration Studies, U.S. policy on statelessness 
“lacks a consistent legal framework for dealing with stateless individuals, 
leaving many in protracted deportation proceedings and exposing many more 
to exploitation by employers, landlords, and law enforcement officials.”106 
For Mikhail Sebastian and the many like him, living under the current 
U.S. legal framework for stateless persons is nothing short of a nightmare.107  
Before Sebastian found himself on American Samoa for fifteen months, 
another bizarre turn of events led Sebastian to the U.S.  Sebastian, an ethnic 
Armenian, was born in Nagorno-Karabakh, a disputed territory in 
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Azerbaijan, while it was under Soviet rule.108  After the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, both Armenia and Azerbaijan refused to recognize Sebastian 
as their citizen.109  After three years of living with what Sebastian referred to 
as “discrimination, harassment and fear,” Sebastian came to the U.S. on a 
travel visa and subsequently filed a petition for asylum, which was denied.110  
U.S. efforts to deport him failed, however, because he was a citizen of no 
country and no country wanted to accept him.111  After spending six months 
in jail, Sebastian was released, given a worker’s permit, and required to 
report to the Department of Homeland Security every three months.112  
During the sixteen years Sebastian lived in the United States before he found 
himself trapped on American Samoa, however, Sebastian was required every 
year to reapply for the worker’s permit, a lengthy and expensive process that 
entailed taking time off work and thus risking the loss of his job.113  
Throughout all of this, Sebastian lived in fear of “being thrown into 
immigration detention at any time, even though [he had] broken no laws.”114 
Sebastian, and others like him, offer a very vivid portrayal of the 
deficiencies in U.S. immigration laws and policies which allow innocent 
people—people whose only crime is statelessness—to fall through the 
cracks. 115   
With respect to international law, the U.S. is neither a signatory to the 
1954 Statelessness Convention nor is it a signatory to the 1961 Statelessness 
Convention.116  Thus, the United States is not bound by any of the provisions 
in either of these conventions.  Other international conventions are also 
relevant here.  The 1962 American Convention on Human Rights recognizes 
the right of every person to have a nationality in Article 20.117  Article 20 
goes on to confer a jus soli right for a stateless individual, so that an 
individual has the right to the nationality of the state where he was born “if 
he does not have the right to any other nationality.”118  Additionally, Article 
20 states: “No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality or of the 
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right to change it.”119  The United States signed but never ratified the 
American Convention on Human Rights.120 
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the 1951 
Refugee Convention) defines the term refugee and sets forth a 
“comprehensive codification of the rights of refugees at the international 
level.”121  Article 1 defines refugees as persons who are unwilling or unable 
to avail themselves to the protections of their countries of nationality or 
origin, due to a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion.”122  The 1951 Refugee Convention was originally limited in scope 
to affected persons in the aftermath of the Second World War.  But the 1967 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees extended the scope of the 1951 
Refugee Convention to eliminate the “geographical and temporal limits,” 
thus allowing for “universal coverage.”123  The U.S. signed the Protocol in 
1967, and subsequently enacted legislation that incorporated its central 
provisions.124  This is significant in that the individuals who are considered 
to be both refugees and stateless persons receive some amount of 
protection—like the ability to obtain travel documents.125  Those who are 
only stateless, however, are left without protection. 
2.  Attempted Legislation 
  a.  Comprehensive Immigration Reform 
In June of 2013, the Senate passed the Border Security, Economic 
Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act (Immigration 
Modernization Act).126  The bill awaited consideration by the House of 
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Representatives, but was never brought to the floor for a vote.127  Stateless 
persons and their status are mentioned in § 3405 of the Immigration 
Modernization Act, which is designed to amend 8 U.S.C. § 1151.128  This 
amendment, if enacted, would allow stateless persons to apply for 
conditional lawful status at the discretion of either the Secretary of the 
Department of Homeland Security or the Attorney General.129  This 
discretion includes situations involving humanitarian issues and family 
unity.130  One year after the granting of conditional status, the stateless 
individual may apply for lawful permanent residence in the U.S., subject to 
other prerequisites.131 
Whether Congress will pass comprehensive immigration reform remains 
uncertain.  Further, it is unclear if such a reform would include the 
Immigration Modernization Act’s statelessness language, if any language at 
all.  If the Immigration Modernization Act or a similar bill were to pass in a 
“piecemeal” fashion,132 statelessness could be left out entirely.  Note that 
Senator Charles Grassley, the current chairman of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, which has jurisdiction over the Act, offered an amendment to the 
Immigration Modernization Act with the stated purpose of striking the 
stateless provision from the bill.133  In addition, President Obama expressed 
willingness to accept the “piecemeal” approach suggested by House 
Republicans for passing the immigration reform.134  Either scenario would be 
detrimental for stateless persons in the U.S.  Striking the statelessness 
provision would leave countless stateless individuals without any path to 
citizenship or to a lawful status.  Similarly, using a piecemeal approach will 
lower the likelihood of a statelessness provision like § 3405 passing on its 
own, as opposed to as part of a package deal. 
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  b.  Refugee Protection Act 
In March 2013, Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT) reintroduced the Refugee 
Protection Act (S. 645) in the U.S. Senate and Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-CA) 
introduced a companion bill in the U.S. House of Representatives.135  The 
statelessness protection provision of the Immigration Modernization Act is 
almost identical to Section 7 of the Refugee Protection Act.  Both allow for 
the possibility of stateless persons attaining conditional lawful status with the 
potential of eventually receiving lawful permanent residence after a year, if 
certain conditions are met.136  The Refugee Protection Act is intended to pass 
as part of the comprehensive immigration reform, and would improve U.S. 
protections for refugee and asylum seekers.137 
  c.  Problems with Proposed Language  
There are several problems with § 3405 of the Immigration 
Modernization Act that need to be addressed.  First, the language of the bill 
is very broad and leaves too much discretion in the hands of government 
authorities.  For example, § 210A(a)(2) gives the Secretary of the 
Department of Homeland Security the discretion to designate specific groups 
of individuals as stateless for purposes of the section.138  Section 210A(b)(1) 
gives discretion to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security 
and the Attorney General to provide the conditional lawful status discussed 
above if certain conditions are met.139  Other portions of § 210A assert that 
the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security “may authorize an 
alien . . . to engage in employment in the United States,” “may issue 
appropriate travel documents,” and, most importantly, “may adjust the status 
of an alien granted conditional lawful status . . . to that of an alien lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence.”140 
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Along these same lines, the bill fails to define certain key terms.  For 
instance, there is no definition for the term “conditional lawful status” or 
“lawful permanent residence” in the text of § 3405 or elsewhere in the bill.  
Furthermore, § 3405 is the only section in which the term “conditional lawful 
status” is used.141  Such failure can result in a lack of clarity as to the rights a 
stateless individual has under a conditional lawful status and when that status 
can be converted into a lawful permanent residence, also known as a “green 
card.”142 
Lastly, the path to citizenship in § 3405—namely, acquiring conditional 
lawful status, followed by lawful permanent residence—is unique.  No other 
class of people is required to follow such path.  This can arguably lead to 
arbitrary application of the section and a lack of information for stateless 
persons regarding their rights under the conditional lawful status propounded 
by the bill. 
B.  E.U. Laws and Policies 
The European Union was created after the Second World War by the 
Treaty of Paris founding the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952, 
and today consists of twenty-eight member states.143  In 1992, the Treaty of 
Maastricht, also known as the Treaty on European Union, created European 
citizenship.144  The Treaty on European Union was subsequently amended by 
both the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007,145 
but the basic features, rights, and benefits of E.U. citizenship were preserved 
in each.146  There are several rights that E.U. citizenship confers on its 
citizens: the right to freely move and reside within the member states,147 the 
right to vote and stand in municipal elections in the member state where the 
citizen resides, regardless of whether he is a national of that state,148 the right 
to the diplomatic and consular protection of other member states within the 
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territory of a third country,149 as well as the right to petition the European 
Parliament.150  However, in order to be considered a citizen of the E.U., you 
must first be a citizen in one of the member states.151  This means that since 
there is a lack of uniformity in nationality laws throughout the E.U.,152 states 
can essentially decide whether an individual enjoys both the privileges of 
citizenship of their state as well as E.U. citizenship, or neither.  The potential 
implications of this member state sovereignty in making their own 
nationality and citizenship laws on stateless persons is vast—each individual 
state is free to decide whether or not stateless persons will have a path to 
citizenship. 
1.  European-Specific Treaties 
In the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), Article 3 of 
Protocol 4 establishes the right of an individual to enter the country of that 
individual’s nationality.153  Article 4 further prohibits the collective 
expulsion of foreigners.154  By the 1980s, with the emergence of mass 
migration, and as unwanted immigration became politicized, the application 
of the 1951 Refugee Convention and the ECHR in European states became 
more contested in cases dealing with non-nationals.155 
There are some indications that the E.U. does not give all its member 
states complete sovereignty over their nationality laws.  As the 1997 
European Convention on Nationality establishes in Article 4, each state’s 
rules on nationality shall be based on certain principles—including the 
principle that “statelessness” shall be avoided.156  Article 6, which discusses 
the acquisition of nationality in member states, asserts that the internal law of 
said member states shall provide a means for acquiring nationality for 
individuals found in its territory that would otherwise be stateless.157  Article 
8 further states that each state shall allow renunciation of its nationality as 
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long as that renunciation does not result in statelessness,158 and Article 9 
goes on to say that the states shall allow recovery of nationality in their 
internal law for its former nationals who are “lawfully and habitually” 
residing in the state.159 
In the 2006 Treaty Establishing the European Community (the EC 
Treaty), Article 12 prohibits any discrimination based on nationality.160  
Article 13 of the EC Treaty authorizes the European Union to take action to 
combat discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin, among other 
things.161  This could potentially give the E.U. authority to protect those that 
are stateless in their member states. 
The Race Directive of 2000 arose out of Article 13 of the EC Treaty, 
which deals with combating various forms of discrimination.162  The Race 
Directive’s stated purpose is to help to combat racial and ethnic 
discrimination.163  The Directive does not, however, apply to “difference[s] 
of treatment based on nationality” and to “any treatment which arises from 
the legal status of the third-country nationals and stateless persons 
concerned.”164  This means that member states can refuse to grant individuals 
nationality on the basis of race or ethnicity.165  
In the 2010 case Rottman v. Bayern, the European Court of Justice held 
that Germany’s deprivation of nationality, in a case in which nationality had 
been obtained by deception, was legal under E.U. law, even if it resulted in 
statelessness and loss of E.U. citizenship.166  This reaffirmed Article 7 of the 
1997 European Convention on Nationality discussed above, which states that 
a member state’s internal law cannot result in the loss of nationality such that 
a person would become stateless, except if the nationality was acquired by 
“fraudulent conduct, false information or concealment of any relevant fact 
attributable to the applicant.”167  Other than this single exception, however, 
Article 7 states that such internal laws, including those that lead to 
statelessness, are prohibited.168 
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2.  Differences in Nationality Laws Among EU Member States 
Several countries, including Germany, Austria, and Italy, determine 
nationality based on jus sanguinis rather than jus soli.169  This jus sanguinis 
framework implies that there is a potential for multiple generations of 
stateless persons.170  A closer look into the nationality laws of France, the 
United Kingdom, Slovenia, and Estonia will illustrate the broad range of 
differences and the impact of such differences on the stateless individuals in 
each of the countries respectively. 
  a.  France: Double Jus Soli and the Expulsion of Roma 
France currently has a “double jus soli” system along with its jus 
sanguinis system.171  The “double jus soli” system requires two generations 
in order to establish nationality based on jus soli.172  In a pure “double jus 
soli” system, statelessness would be limited to two generations instead of 
one.  Under the jus sanguinis system in France, a child, regardless of where 
he is born, can claim French nationality if one parent is French at the time of 
their birth.173  France goes even further than this by allowing for citizenship 
when an individual is born in France and is still living there once they reach 
eighteen years of age.174  For foreigners, naturalization is technically possible 
after five years of residence, but is more reliable in such a short period if the 
foreigner’s spouse is a French national.175  Further, a newer citizen can be 
deprived of citizenship if he or she commits certain crimes within ten years 
of his or her naturalization.176  French law also allows renunciation of 
citizenship as long as such renunciation does not leave the individual 
stateless.177 
French law and policy, however, are not without its problems.  In 2003, 
two laws were passed that restricted naturalization by allowing for exclusion 
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of undesirable foreigners from the naturalization process.178  This policy of 
“selective immigration” led to the requirement of a “reception and 
integration contract” in 2008, which fundamentally is just an agreement to 
assimilate.179  In addition to the fact that language qualifications for 
naturalization were strengthened in 2003 and 2005, the “integration contract” 
codified these requirements in 2007.180 
Most notably, President François Hollande’s Administration continued to 
“forcibly evict Roma from settlements as well as expel Roma of foreign 
origin from France.”181  The Roma, commonly referred to as “gypsies,” have 
been subjected to discrimination throughout history and today the Roma are 
often targets of violence.182  Tens of thousands of Roma live in Europe with 
no rights and no nationality.183  Many of them are stateless.184  Many contend 
that France’s evictions of the Romani people violate their human rights and 
“fail to comply with both French and European Union law.”185  Despite these 
pressures, it is unlikely that the Hollande Administration will change its 
policy because the expulsion of migrant Roma “remains a politically popular 
policy in France.”186 
  b.  The United Kingdom: Revoking Citizenship from Terror Suspects 
The United Kingdom, in April 2013, adopted a new statelessness 
procedure in Part 14 of the Immigration Rules.  It allows stateless individuals 
a route to having their stateless status recognized as well as legalizing their 
presence.187  According to statements made by UNHCR spokesperson 
Melissa Fleming at a 2013 press briefing, a key feature of the new procedure 
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is that it allows for the determination of whether or not the individual is in 
fact stateless.188  The new procedure does not apply to the de facto stateless.  
Once that person has taken sufficient steps to gain recognition as a national 
under the laws of their state, however, they are then considered to be de jure 
stateless rather than de facto stateless and fall within the new protections of 
Part 14.189  Thus, a person who is de jure stateless and present in the U.K. 
can benefit from the new rule, as long as they meet the international 
definition of a stateless person as set forth by the 1954 Statelessness 
Convention and are not excluded.190  The stateless individual may be 
excluded for a number of reasons, including: individuals who are already 
receiving U.N. assistance, individuals believed to have committed war 
crimes, the existence of reasonable grounds to believe the individual is a 
security threat to the U.K., or there is another country in which they would 
be admitted.191  No legal aid is available to help individuals with their 
stateless application.192  When applying for a grant of leave to remain in the 
U.K. with stateless status, an individual is given a leave period of thirty 
months and can apply for extension.193  After five years of leave to remain, 
an individual may apply for indefinite leave to remain and, eventually, may 
apply for naturalization, provided that the necessary requirements are met.194  
If an individual’s stateless application is refused, there is no specific right to 
appeal but the refusal may be subject to judicial review in some instances.195 
In October 2013, the U.K. Supreme Court decided the case of Secretary 
of State for the Home Department v. Al-Jedda, concerning a December 2007 
order by the Secretary of State purporting to deprive Al-Jedda of his U.K. 
citizenship.196  In September 2004, Al-Jedda traveled from the U.K. to Iraq 
where he was arrested by U.S. forces in October 2004.197  He was held in 
Iraq for three years by British forces due to his suspected involvement with a 
terrorist organization.198  The 1981 British Nationality Act states that “[t]he 
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Secretary of State may not make an order . . . if he is satisfied that the order 
would make a person stateless.”199  The U.K. Supreme Court examined the 
UDHR, and the 1954 and 1961 Statelessness Conventions, along with other 
instruments of international law, recognizing the “evil of statelessness” and 
the right to a nationality.200  The Court eventually held that the order violated 
the 1981 British Nationality Act and rejected the Secretary of State’s 
argument that it was Al-Jedda’s failure to apply to regain his Iraqi 
citizenship, not the order, which caused Al-Jedda to be stateless.201 
More recently, Theresa May, who is the Home Secretary, expressed a 
desire to bring legislation that would allow the confiscation of U.K. 
citizenship from any suspected terrorist whose conduct is “seriously 
prejudicial to the interests of the UK,” without regard for those U.K. citizens 
without dual nationalities that would be left stateless.202  Under current law, 
the Home Secretary has the power to strip individuals of U.K. citizenship if 
they are dual-nationals, but May wants to find a way around domestic and 
international rules in order to strip terror suspects of their U.K. citizenship, 
even if doing so would leave those individuals stateless.203  In the 1950s and 
1960s, when most western countries denounced denaturalization, Britain did 
not do so, although it rarely utilized this power.204  Post-9/11, however, there 
was an increase in the utilization of this power, and in 2006 an act was 
passed lowering the requirements for revocation of citizenship from both 
naturalized and native-born citizens.205 
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  c.  Slovenia: A State in Transition  
The recently established Republic of Slovenia (1991) provides an 
interesting case study because of the problems stemming from the unusually 
high number of state transitions occurring in a relatively short period of 
time.206  Some 200,000 people became de facto stateless after the transition 
from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) to the Republic of 
Slovenia because their personal documents were destroyed or invalidated, 
leading to their expulsion.207  Article 40 of the Citizenship of the Republic of 
Slovenia Act sets forth the conditions for naturalization in Slovenia, stating 
that if a citizen of another republic that registered permanent residence in 
Slovenia on the day of the plebiscite of independence and has actually been 
living in Slovenia, and has filed an application within six months of the Act’s 
entry into force, then he shall acquire citizenship in the Republic of 
Slovenia.208  After gaining independence, citizenship and alien policies left 
25,671 long-term immigrants from other SFRY republics without citizenship 
and denied them status as legal aliens.209  Once the six month window set 
forth in Article 40 closed, not all who applied for citizenship under the 
Article were accepted—some were rejected and others did not apply due to a 
number of reasons, mainly false information about the application process.210  
The Aliens Act of 1991 laid out various policies applicable to foreigners 
entering Slovenia, but did not address those who became stateless due to 
secession.211  Those that did not become citizens in 1991 were “secretly 
erased from the register of permanent residents,” an action that became 
known as “erasure.”212  Under the 1991 Aliens Act, erased persons were 
treated as any other foreign citizen and many could not meet the required 
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criteria of the Act.213  The result was a very significant detriment to the rights 
of the individuals who were subject to erasure—they lacked valid documents 
for identification and often their legal status was revoked, leaving them 
without access to the most basic rights.214 
  d.  Estonia: Where the Stateless Have Rights 
Estonia is also worthy of examination since de jure statelessness is 
relatively common there due to its nationality laws.215  Between 1992 and 
2009, about 150,000 persons were naturalized in Estonia, with about 100,000 
remaining stateless non-citizens.216  Compared to other member states of the 
E.U., Estonia’s citizenship policies are much more restrictive.217  Generally, 
stateless non-citizens enjoy the same rights and free access to social 
protection as citizens in Estonia.218  Most of the discrimination that occurs 
against stateless non-citizens is based on their Russian cultural background, 
rather than their legal status.219 
3.  Statelessness Determination Procedures 
Some E.U. member states are moving towards establishing determination 
procedures to ascertain the status of stateless individuals within their 
borders.220  Some states delegate the determination authority to already 
existing authorities.221  For instance, France, Spain, and the U.K. have 
delegated statelessness determination to their asylum authorities.222  
Additionally, these member states do not require lawful presence of a 
stateless individual before they are entitled to a status determination 
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procedure.223  This is positive because it encourages efficiency in status 
determination and does not negatively impact or deter individuals who may 
not have any lawful status.224 
C.  Lessons from the European Union 
There are lessons that the United States can take away from this 
examination of various European Union member states.  First, the U.S. is 
already better situated to eradicate statelessness due to its use of jus soli for 
acquiring citizenship.  However, this does not mean that the United States 
should ignore the current stateless population simply because the problem is 
limited to one generation.  Rather, it should recognize the limited burden of 
providing these law-abiding individuals with a legal presence so that they no 
longer have to be treated as second-class citizens. 
Second, as we see with France and the United Kingdom, statelessness can 
be a serious problem, even in the most developed western nations.  Of 
course, the U.S. is not expelling stateless individuals in a discriminatory way 
as the French are doing to the Romani people, nor is it purposely revoking 
citizenship from individuals suspected of terrorism like in the U.K.  
However, many stateless persons in the U.S. are still being deprived of their 
most basic and fundamental human rights.  The U.S. should serve as an 
example for both developing and developed nations alike by, at the very 
least, establishing status determination procedures and granting stateless 
persons some kind of path to obtaining legal status so that they can enjoy 
basic human rights such as access to healthcare, education, and the freedom 
of movement. 
Lastly, as alluded to above, it is important to realize that this is an 
international legal issue.  Statelessness exists in developed and developing 
countries alike, and the far-reaching consequences of statelessness impact 
more than just the nations that are allowing it.  Many of the individuals who 
are stateless in the U.S. and the E.U. are valuable members of their 
communities.  If those individuals were granted the rights to travel and work, 
they would benefit their respective countries economically as well as 
socially. 
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IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
A.  Implications of Proposed Legislation Passing 
Congress should pass comprehensive immigration reform that includes a 
statelessness provision.  While the language in the Immigration Modernization 
Act is incomplete in some areas, passing a comprehensive immigration reform 
bill including § 3405 or something comparable would be a step in the right 
direction; it would relieve some of the pressure on the stateless population in 
the United States since it would at least allow stateless individuals to obtain a 
permanent legal status.  Ideally, the broad and deferential language in the 
legislation would be reworded so as to minimize confusion and endow 
stateless individuals with clear and discernible rights.  If nothing else, the term 
“conditional lawful status” needs to be further defined so that it is clear what 
rights it confers onto individuals who are granted that status. 
B.  Implications of Proposed Legislation Not Passing and the Alternatives 
If comprehensive immigration reform legislation does not pass, the 
prospect for stateless persons receiving any lawful status in the U.S. is slim, 
at best.  But the most plausible course of action seems to be legislation, 
which will be unlikely to make it through Congress if it is not presented in 
conjunction with an immigration reform package. 
One alternative is to separate the legislation on statelessness from the 
greater immigration reform bill and try to pass it on its own.  With this 
alternative, a bill with language similar to that of § 3405 is unlikely to garner 
enough support in Congress.  Congressional Democrats greatly favor 
comprehensive immigration reform, recognizing that many of the current 
issues in immigration law are greatly intertwined. 
A second alternative is U.S. accession to the 1954 and 1961 Statelessness 
Conventions.  However, it is not enough to just sign on to these 
Conventions—the United Kingdom is a signatory of both but that has not 
stopped it from acting in contradiction to those conventions recently, as 
discussed above.  The U.S. would have to ratify the treaty and enact enabling 
legislation before being bound by the terms of these Conventions. 
A third alternative is the adoption of something similar to the 1997 
European Convention on Nationality—a law that would construe nationality 
laws so as to avoid statelessness and would provide a means for acquiring 
citizenship for those individuals who would otherwise be stateless, except in 
cases of fraud.  Effectively, this kind of law would do the same thing as the 
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Immigration Modernization Act would if it were enacted, but would most 
likely have a harder time finding approval from Congress on its own as 
opposed to when presented in a package of comprehensive immigration 
reform. 
Another alternative would be to create stateless determination procedures 
like those that exist in the E.U.  The authority to make status decisions could 
potentially be delegated to immigration courts.  This new authority, however, 
would likely need Congressional approval as well. 
Because deep uncertainties are inherent in these other alternatives, 
passage of a comprehensive immigration reform bill is the best chance for 
stateless persons to obtain a path to citizenship.  The four alternatives listed 
above would be viable if they could pass through Congress standing alone, 
but this seems unlikely.  While the language of the bill is somewhat 
ambiguous, the ability to obtain a conditional lawful status and lawful 
permanent residence thereafter is better than the current state of affairs, 
which does not allow for stateless persons to ever be granted citizenship.  
Thus, at this point in time, the passage of a comprehensive immigration 
reform bill, ideally with more favorable language, is the most viable solution 
for beginning to solve the problem of statelessness in the United States. 
